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 Ontology and Social Relations: reply to Doug Porpora and to Colin Wight1 
I am pleased to be debating here with Doug Porpora and Colin Wight, something I am more 
used to doing over a glass or two than in print (actually the same is true re John Searle, 
though it is a less frequent occurrence). This move to a more public forum has led to 
Porpora’s and Wight’s excellent critical commentaries, and I am grateful.  But it does not 
seem to have stopped them seeking to provoke through attributing labels they know full well 
are very far from any I might accept. Here I rise to their provocation. 
 At the heart of their interventions is a shared concern that the conception I defend 
prioritises a certain form of social relation, constituted through matched rights and 
obligations, a form they deem to be either insufficiently material or conflictual, or overly 
subjective or socialised. 
 It is certainly the case that features like rights and obligations may themselves be, in 
part, mind-dependent, being either the material (remembered) outcomes of previous decision 
making processes including declarations, or, and I suspect more frequently, emergent 
components of material collective practices.  But whatever the case, they are always not only 
exercised by, but emergent from, and remaining dependent upon, material human beings 
participating in their equally material inter- and intra-actions, and so cannot reasonably be 
considered as other than features of an emergent powers materialism (see Lawson, 2012); 
there is nothing immaterialist in any of this. 
 This, though, does not obviate the fact that Porpora and Wight remain unhappy with 
my specific relational emphasis. Seemingly inferring that this emphasis means that the 
conception I defend is unable, as it stands, to accommodate other forms, or significant 
features, of social relations, Porpora and Wight find it deficient. At one point, Porpora 
suggests that “power over in any of its manifestations cannot be accommodated by Lawson’s 
ontology” (Porpora, 2016, p. 9).  This might be interpreted as a rejection of the content of the 
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ontology.  Most of the time, though, Porpora makes it clear that he supposes that the 
conception I defend (as indeed with Searle’s) is merely limited in scope and “In principle, 
[…] could be augmented to accommodate the stronger more materialist view of social 
structure” (ibid, p. 4) to which Porpora himself subscribes, presumably including ‘power-
over’ relations. 
 This is a fairly constructive and friendly line of criticism, and, if I understand it 
correctly, quite restrained in that these authors nowhere suggest that, beyond limiting 
coverage, the conception I defend leads to actual error.  So I feel somewhat churlish in 
nevertheless opposing it. 
 Yet I should. For whilst the conception I defend is hardly limited to accommodating 
relations of the positional rights-obligation sort (though I do regard the latter as fundamental), 
I am not convinced anyway that most of the forms of relations or relational features that 
Porpora and Wight put forward as alternative are actually any such thing. It is the latter set of 
issues that I suspect are the more interesting to discuss here; so I start out focusing on them, 
turning to the broader coverage of the ontological framework I defend only briefly towards 
the end.  
Power relations 
 I consider first some examples of supposed alternative relations or features provided 
early on by Porpora.  Adopting the perspective of a third social ontology group, Porpora 
focuses on structure, suggesting that this is something: 
“[….] which like Lawson we generally […] consider to be social relations but which, 
unlike Lawson, we do not confine to relations defined by subjectively recognised rights 
and obligations; instead we extend structure to extra-discursive relations like power 
over, inequality, exploitation and conflicts of interest” (ibid, p. 3, italics in the original).    
Ontology and Social Relations: reply to Doug Porpora and to Colin Wight 4 
 
 
As I say, I turn to broader issues like the claim that I “confine” all relations to those 
constituted by matching recognised rights and obligations in due course.  At this point I want 
to examine the suggestion that the relations noted by Porpora somehow represent forms that 
lie beyond the positional rights-obligations relation that is central to the conception I defend.  
 Consider first the power over relation. In fact, the feature of conferring ‘power over’ 
is, I suggest, the very essence of a right-obligation positional relationship. Where a right is 
attached to one position a matching obligation is also attached somewhere, usually to a 
different (set of) position(s). It is through the mechanism of exercising a positional right that 
a right-bearer can get a corresponding obligation-bearer to do various things whether or not 
the latter cares to.  As a university lecturer I have the right to request a book kept in the 
basement of my Faculty library (a basement that only library staff are able to access).  If I 
exercise that right, then someone else has the obligation to go fetch it even if it is the last 
thing in the world he or she wants to do.  This is the nub of all ‘power over’ relations: the 
ability to get others to do what is wanted of them irrespective of the desires of these others.  
 Of course, the physical ability to so act, the powers of efficient causation invoked in 
any exercise of deontic/positional power, say in requesting a book, or in fetching the book 
from the basement, relate to capacities possessed by individuals independently of their 
occupying the relevant positions. That, in part, is why I insist against Searle that all positions 
have at least one occupant, that there are no ‘free standing Y terms’.  
 I do not suggest that all ‘power over’ relations are of this rights-obligations sort 
(though I strongly suspect most of the ontologically interesting ones are -- an issue to which I 
return below). But I do maintain that all rights-obligation relations are of this ‘power over’ 
sort. I certainly think Porpora is not quite right to suppose that: “[…] power over in any of its 
manifestations cannot be accommodated by Lawson’s ontology”  
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Exploitation  
 Porpora also talks of relations of exploitation.  This is an example that, far from being 
at odds with the conception of rights-obligation relations I defend, serves well to illustrate the 
scope and relevance of the latter. With Porpora being a Marxist, I assume he refers to Marx’s 
notion of exploitation.  Consider what is involved. An emergent social totality that is a 
capitalist firm includes amongst its positioned components both workers and employers.  
Many of the rights (obligations) of the one are matched to the obligations (rights) of the 
other. Also amongst the various components of the firm is the labour power of each worker 
positioned as a commodity. Glossing over the details, Marx’s idea is that under certain 
conditions typical to capitalist competition the wage paid by the employer to the worker to 
acquire her or his labour power for a given period of time (tending to its  value or the amount 
required for the reproduction of a worker's labour power expended) is typically much less 
than the value derived from the expenditure of this labour power over the same period of time 
in producing the firm’s products, and realised by selling these final products qua final 
commodities. Where, the value of (and so price received for) the products produced through 
the expenditure of labour power is greater than the value (or wages paid for the purchase) of 
the labour power expended, there is a surplus.  The process just described whereby surplus is 
generated is, in Marx’s terms, one of exploitation2.  This is all part of the capitalist process as 
Marx theorised it, and the rights-obligation framework is essential to it.   
 Marx does not claim that surplus is produced without people accepting in the sense of 
consenting to what goes on. His theory of exploitation is not an arbitrary observation 
focussed upon highly contingent events or developments, somehow operating outside the 
prevailing position-rights-obligation framework. Rather, exploitation based on such a 
framework is a fundamental component of Marx’s explanation of how the capitalist system 
functions.  It is a system in which most individuals, because lacking (rights of ownership of) 
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their own means of production, have no real option but to consent to being part of the process 
as positioned workers. Consent here means to accept being positioned as a wage-labourer 
under whatever conditions (rights-obligations relations) can best be achieved. 
 Porpora later quotes Lenin as saying that individuals enter relations without ever 
realising there is a social relation of production involved.  But even if the category ‘social 
relation of production’ is not explicitly theorised by all participants in the relevant 
community, each must be aware at some level of her or his own positional rights and 
obligations, and implicitly thereby that others have obligations and rights that match them. 
Otherwise the system would not function at all.  But these matched rights and obligations are 
indeed the relations of production. The features that likely are hidden from most of those 
involved in the labour process include the complex workings of the system as a whole, the 
totality that the positional social relations formed by matching rights and obligations, 
including fundamentally the relations of production, serve to organise.  
 Porpora’s remaining two examples comprise inequality relations and conflicts of 
interest. But both are again all about rights and obligations. Barring a few chance events like 
winning a national lottery, the place of each individual in the structure of opportunities, 
including wages and other forms of income, depends on her or his (restricted) access to 
various positions, and the mechanisms in place for protecting or advancing rights associated 
with positions occupied (including income, benefits, bonus, overtime, paid/unpaid leave, 
ownership and hereditary, etc. rights,). The distribution of rights and obligations under 
capitalism underpins and grounds it all. 
 And major conflicts of interest most obviously arise precisely when individuals find 
themselves in various different positions simultaneously where the obligations of the 
different specific positions are in conflict (for example where a drugs prescribing GP is also 
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positioned as member of a drugs company; or, say, a relative/partner of a job candidate is 
positioned on the appointments committee).  
Conflict in general 
 Colin Wight too is concerned to emphasis alternative forms of social relation to those 
I prioritise. Wight’s central criticism is seemingly that a rights and obligations framework is 
based only on cooperation and not conflict, so that it is conflictual relations I am unable to 
accommodate.  
 According to the conception I defend cooperation is indeed essential. But so too the 
potential for conflict (and not just conflicts of interest) is intimately involved; the two are not 
mutually exclusive (and trust and trustworthiness are essential in both cases). This is just 
because the exercising of a right by one individual means simultaneously getting at least one 
other individual, that bears a corresponding obligation, to act in ways that may be quite 
opposed to her or his actual desires. My faculty librarian (and in whom I trust and who is 
proving trustworthy in continuously cooperating) may yet be totally fed up with going to the 
library basement to retrieve books requested by me, and may even tell me so. 
 Nor need the conflict be of a mild or gentle sort. Police have rights to use violence, 
possibly even use guns, judges have the right to incarcerate people for life, others have the 
rights to issue fines, prohibit, sack, cut budgets, redistribute, detain, exclude, evict, and so on.  
In accepting the rights and obligations of community participation, we all of us accept (in the 
sense of go along with) the fact that rights (for some) of the sort just noted are part of the 
accepted organising structure of the relevant community.  
 Wight also looks to illegal forms of conflict, and so to the exercise of power through 
forms of behaviour that clash with accepted collective practices. Human trafficking is his 
central example. I am hardly going to deny such examples of power. But I do suggest that 
such examples presuppose the conception I defend, and are coherent qua illegal or 
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illegitimate forms of practice only in relation to it (an illegitimacy that conditions the 
typically covert or related forms of behaviour frequently involved, and the responses to it).  
My concern though is with ontology. Forms of substantive practice clearly do vary according 
to whether or not they accord with community accepted structures. But the content of such 
practices are the concern of substantive science not ontology3; as far as I can see the 
ontological conception I defend remains relevant throughout. 
 Moreover, I suspect in any case that the more significant, because systematic and 
consequential, cases of illegal practice and such like, are not merely conditioned by the wider 
community structure of positions, rights and obligations, but are themselves coordinated 
through additional relational structures that conform to, and so illustrate, the ontological 
conception in question. 
 Consider again Wight’s example of trafficking.  As I understand it much of this is 
fairly large scale.  If so, a good deal of complex co-ordination will be involved. As result, at 
least in such cases, I would expect the ontological conception I defend, if at all adequate, to 
provide the basic framework of which the trafficking organisation is seen to be a specific 
manifestation.   
 It seemingly does. For example, I note that a 2008 extensive working paper produced 
by The Vienna Forum to Fight Human Trafficking, presented at a UN sponsored workshop on 
Profiling the Trafficker4, reports that most trafficking organisations are structured as 
syndicates, ranging from family organisations to highly complex international organisations.  
Further, it finds that the practices of individual traffickers must be understood “in terms of 
their function in the hierarchy of roles in the trafficking organization or operation”. In this 
regard, the report distinguishes positions of ‘master trafficker’, ‘primary trafficker’ (a 
position with numerous occupants; each of whom is charged with [accepts the obligation of] 
seeking to uncover sources of supply and demand, and do the buying and selling), ‘secondary 
Ontology and Social Relations: reply to Doug Porpora and to Colin Wight 9 
 
 
trafficker’ (again a position with many occupants; the latter are responsible for delivering 
human cargo to primary traffickers); ‘grassroots intelligence gatherer’ (once more a position 
with many occupants; these are charged with seeking out vulnerable people); and so on.  The 
authors report that right “throughout the process of trafficking, people (individual traffickers) 
are required to perform particular roles” as components of the organisation.  Here, positions, 
and positioned rights and obligations are, as elsewhere, central to the functioning of the 
organisations in question. 
 In the context of discussing these issues Wight quotes me as arguing that in general: 
“In accepting (and being accepted) to be positioned as a member of a particular community, 
each individual makes a (usually merely implicit) commitment to conforming to the accepted 
collective practices of that community.” Wight points out that this is not true for those 
trafficked.  But of course, this is precisely because those being trafficked do not accept being 
positioned in this way.  Even so, the substantive situation (once more a concern of 
substantive science rather than ontology) still relates back to the rights-obligation framework 
in that the trafficked, as with any prisoners, can be understood in terms of their having had 
most of their wider community rights forcibly (and in this case illegally) removed. Most 
associated practices (modes of resistance, methods of control, etc.) will follow from this 
feature of the situation.  
Complexity 
 An additional charge that Wight introduces, this time under the theme of emergence, 
is that the specific relational conception I emphasise cannot deal adequately with forms of 
complexity. As a preliminary Wight rejects my use of the term ‘emergence’ and informs us 
that he confines its use to “the coming into being of a new level of life” 5 (Wight, 2016, p. 7).  
I see no good reason to do so. I find it potentially philosophically interesting to focus on any 
cases where novel causal powers come about, especially if they are irreducible to those of the 
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elements when considered apart from any (equally emergent) organising structure. Of course, 
I do also apply the term to the coming into being of new levels, or better phenomena regarded 
as being at new levels.  Indeed, I have traced the emergence of matter from quantum fields 
and their excitations though all the various ‘levels’ until we get the emergence of human 
beings, and through our interactions, the emergence of social reality (see e.g. Lawson 2012).  
In all this I argue that the revealed pattern is the emergence of totalities out of pre-existing 
phenomena that become organised as components.  Of course the process is different in each 
case.  That’s why I think it is useful to use the term emergence interpreted as I do; it serves as 
a marker or a placeholder of where context-specific investigatory work has always to be 
done. 
 Such preliminaries aside, though, Wight’s focus remains social relations. He informs 
us that communities have “differing sets of relations” (ibid, p. 8) to those based on rights and 
obligations, adding, strangely, that “rights and obligation[s] do not govern individuals as 
such, but rather they govern the relations between positioned actors.” (p. 8).  This seems 
incoherent.  Aside from the obvious point that rights and obligations can only directly 
influence conscious beings, sets of connecting rights and obligations are ‘the relations 
between positioned actors’. 
 His main point, however, is that my framework, focussing on relations constituted by 
rights and obligations, is not appropriate to understanding either how different communities 
intra-relate to form a complex national state or whatever, or the natures of complex separate 
communities like the corporation.  
 But of course it is.  To the contrary, it, or something very much like it, is essential to 
any such understanding however complexly interconnected or structured the particular 
communities may be. The various communities Wight lists (the military, political and cultural 
bodies, etc.) are precisely positioned as components of the wider totality that is a nation state, 
Ontology and Social Relations: reply to Doug Porpora and to Colin Wight 11 
 
 
and thereby get to function to the benefit of the wider hosting community.  In turn, of course, 
nation states may be positioned as components of wider regional communities or ‘unions’, 
accessing thereby their own union-specific rights and obligations6.      
 In his singling out the corporation as a feature that is challenging for the conception I 
defend to accommodate, I can only imagine that Wight fails to recognise that the very reason 
that all corporations, including local governments, schools, charities, and even (actually 
especially) the largest multinational business companies, are able to do as they do, and are as 
complex as they are, is precisely because they themselves are structured by (very particular) 
sets of positions and positional rights and obligations. 
 Each and every corporation, in fact, is constituted as such through of a process of 
(legal) positioning. More specifically, to be incorporated is to be accepted as an occupant of 
the position Judicial Person, a position nested within the wider position of Legal Person (the 
latter also nesting the position Natural Person, occupied by human beings) (see Lawson, 
2015b).  It is through this legal process of positioning that communities, thereby constituted 
as corporations, acquire legal capacity in the sense of gaining access, qua corporations, to 
rights and obligations intended originally only for human beings. Amongst the positioned 
rights so obtained are, first, those of ownership, including of other firms, and second, rights 
of limited liability if an owned firm get into difficulties. It is because of these two sets of 
rights especially that a multinational business corporation can create a multitude of 
subsidiaries, effectively own them, use them for multiple purposes including tax avoidance 
via transfer pricing, the relocating of any other liabilities, and even pursuing courses of profit 
seeking that contain a recognised potential (often realised) for wreaking damage and harm 
throughout the globe (see Lawson, 2015c), and yet, like any human shareholder, claim for 
itself (the right of) limited liability if any subsidiary winds up in trouble. None of this is 
comprehensible without the analytical framework of positions rights and obligations. The 
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latter is not an optional add on, even less is it something without bearing, but is fundamental 
to everything about the corporation’s (possibly complex) constitution and so basic activities 
(see Lawson, 2015b, 2015c).    
Reductionism  
 Wight’s final criticism of my particular relational focus takes the form of describing 
me as a methodological or ontological individualist. This move seems to be primarily 
‘justified’ by the observation that my “social ontology contains individuals” (p.9) and also 
“communities, which are after all collections of individuals” (p. 9). Wight does acknowledge 
that I also posit numerous aspects of social structure, but supposes this hardly counts because 
such structure involves rights and obligations and “the causal force of rights and obligations 
can only manifest itself if individuals recognise them” (p. 9).  
 Of course, any community is not a mere collection of anything but rather comprises 
relationally organised individuals and other components; the relational structure is not an 
inconsequential or additive extra. But yes, individuals do need to be positioned and to 
recognise to a degree their positional rights and obligations, just in order to participate, and 
for the system to work at all. Positions with their rights and obligations are the site at which 
human beings and social structure interconnect.  I do not suggest, of course, that because 
rights and obligations require some kind of recognition and representation, that individuals 
thereby fully or infallibly grasp thereby the prevailing conditions, the processes they are part 
of, or the functioning of other components and totalities that affect them. But they must grasp 
enough for themselves and the system successfully to function (where this occurs). The 
alternative stance is presumably that there is no such connection at all and that casual forces 
of the totality (and its structure) manifest themselves entirely without the participation of 
human individuals. This is methodological or ontological holism, perhaps Wight’s position? 
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But a form of individualism is not the only alternative; reductionism can, and ought, to be 
avoided altogether. 
 The key to it all, as I discuss at length elsewhere (see e.g., Lawson 2013, and my 
current reply to Searle) is indeed the contribution of social structure (including rights and 
obligations). The (emergent) causal powers of emergent totalities are brought to bear not 
without the participation of individuals (holism) and nor because of nothing but the 
participation of individuals (individualism) but through the relationally organised 
participation of positioned individuals (whatever the degree to which the latter fully 
comprehend the wider structures and totalities within which they are acting).  It is just 
because emergent organising relational structures, turning fundamentally on positions and 
associated, to some extent necessarily-recognised, rights and obligations, have a causal 
impact on the actions of individual participants that both individualist and holist forms of 
reduction are untenable. 
Relations in general 
 As Porpora’s paper progresses it becomes increasing clear that those relations that he 
refers to as material, which he supposes cannot be accommodated by the conception I defend, 
are, in the main, not ‘power-over’ relations at all.  Rather they are, or include, relations of 
comparison, order, temporality, fit, distance, correlation, etc., that can indeed hold 
‘objectively’ without being recognised by community participants.  
 Porpora’s illustrations include relations holding between various chess pieces that 
may be “independent of everyone’s notice” (2016, p. 7), though understandably he focuses 
mostly on those that bear on human well-being.  In this regard Porpora makes explicit 
reference to “the match between jobs and job-seekers; equality and inequality” (p. 8); mutual 
(related) threats; mutual benefits, perhaps arising unplanned from actions of seemingly 
separated individuals supposedly guided only by their equally separate individual interests (p. 
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9) (presumably Porpora’s interpretation of Smith’s ‘invisible hand’); and so on. Porpora 
refers to all such relations as ontologically objective; and he notes, quoting Lenin, that they 
are “those that take shape without passing through man’s consciousness”.    
 Here the topic is indeed relations that are somewhat different in nature to the 
matching rights/obligations I tend to emphasise. This brings me to the second line of response 
to the criticisms of Porpora and White, signalled at the outset. 
 Needless to say, I do not at all deny the fact of such relations. Why would I? Indeed, 
how could I? For amongst the basic ontological features that I have maintained throughout is 
a recognition that we human beings for the most part do not create social reality, but rather, 
on finding it given to us at each moment, each draw upon it in acting in always situated ways, 
pursuing our particular situated concerns, in conditions clearly not of our own making, with 
understandings that are always fallible and extremely partial at best, and in so doing thereby 
contribute, along with the simultaneous actions of all others, to the continuous reproduction 
and transformation of social reality in a manner that is mostly unintended and poorly 
understood (see e.g. Lawson, 1994, 1997, 2003, 2012, 2015). Indeed, this is a vision that I 
have continually elaborated as part of the project with which the three of us are involved. 
Given this, how could I possibly not accept or anticipate the fact of all sorts of contrasts and 
relations of quality and quantity, etc., including those emphasised by Porpora and Wight, that 
exist ‘objectively’ and are frequently unnoticed and even, in cases, perhaps beyond detection?  
 The contention I do maintain is not that the scope of social reality reduces to 
positions, rights and obligations, nor that relations of matching rights and obligations are the 
only kind to be found in the social realm, and nor even that they are the only ‘power-over’ 
form, but rather that a case can be made for regarding them as being, from a social 
ontological perspective, a fundamental, and perhaps the most fundamental, form of relation. 
For they are distinguished in being essential to the constitution of social reality, working at all 
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levels to sustain a degree of continuity and stability despite social reality being everywhere 
processual in nature and conforming to the sketch of the preceding paragraph (see especially 
Lawson, 2016 on this).  Let me elaborate this latter point a little as a way of concluding my 
response.  
Final comments  
 The broad thesis I defend, already briefly touched upon, is that reality everywhere, 
from quantum fields to the social domain, consists of emergent totalities formed as 
organisations of pre-existing elements, with such emergent totalities themselves in turn 
becoming very often organised as components of higher level totalities (see e.g. Lawson, 
2012). 
 In the process whereby pre-existing elements come to be organised as components of 
totalities the various sorts of elements involved have somehow to bind together.  This may 
happen through processes of chemical bonding, electrical attraction, collision, etc., and in the 
cases of artefacts through the use of glue, nails, cement, and so on. 
 I have argued that the community, constituted through the organising of human 
beings amongst its components, is the most basic form of social totality (see e.g., Lawson 
2012). In this context, and given that social phenomena are just as fluid as non-social 
phenomena, a central question clearly is what is it that binds together often disparate human 
individuals as components. My answer is that it is the positioning system, whereby 
individuals with the capacities both to trust and be trustworthy slot into community/system 
positions that are inter- and intra-related by way of positional rights and obligations.  For the 
rights attached to one position match obligations somewhere and usually attached to different 
positions, and so serve to ‘bind’ together the relevant position occupants. In short, the 
positional rights/obligations relational framework is pivotal to the achieving of order and 
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stability within a social world inevitably characterised by continuous transformation, and, as 
such, I suggest, warrants being recognised as ontologically rather fundamental.     
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Footnotes 
                                                          
     1 For helpful comments on a first draft I am grateful to Jamie Morgan. 
 2 With the degree of exploitation being the ratio of surplus-labour to necessary labour.  
 3 Wight (2016, p. 7) actually wants me to “explain this phenomenon” of trafficking. 
But, it is not the job of ontology to explain in the sense of identifying the reasons behind it or 
the substantive details of any mechanisms involved -- any more than it’s the job of ontology 
to explain why I keep asking my faculty librarian to fetch certain books etc. Ontology can 
though help us understand the structures that render the practices mentioned feasible and 
intelligible, but the details in any case is down to substantive science. 
 4 Produced under the auspices of the United Nations Initiative to Fight Human 
Trafficking, and downloaded on 14/04 2016 from https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-
trafficking/2008/BP016ProfilingtheTraffickers.pdf 
 5 Although it makes no difference to my response, I suspect Wight means new level 
of ‘being’ rather than ‘life’ here. 
 6 In the case of membership of the European Union see e.g., the UK Government 
document “Rights and obligations of European Union membership” downloaded on April 27, 
2016 from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/516501/Rights
_and_obligations_of_European_Union_membership_web_version.pdf 
 
